Enforcement of opacity security properties for ship information system  by Xing, Bowen et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comScienceDirect
Publishing Services by Elsevier
International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 423e433
http://www.journals.elsevier.com/international-journal-of-naval-architecture-and-ocean-engineering/Enforcement of opacity security properties for ship information system*
Bowen Xing a,*, Jin Dai b, Sheng Liu c
a College of Engineering Science and Technology, Shanghai Ocean University, Shanghai, 201306, China
b Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
c College of Automation, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin, Heilongjiang, 150001, China
Received 23 November 2015; revised 10 May 2016; accepted 11 May 2016
Available online 21 July 2016AbstractIn this paper, we consider the cybersecurity issue of ship information system (SIS) from a new perspective which is called opacity. For a SIS,
its confidential information (named as “secret”) may be leaked through the working behaviors of each Distributed Control Unit (DCU) from an
outside observer called an “intruder” which is able to determine ship's mission state by detecting the source of each data flow from the cor-
responding DCUs in SIS. Therefore we proposed a dual layer mechanism to enforce opacity by activating non-essential DCU during secret
mission. This mechanism is calculated by two types of insertion functions: Safety-assured insertion function ( fIS) and Admissibility-assured
insertion function ( fIA). Due to different objectives, fIS is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret behaviors from a unsafe
one, and the division of fIA is to polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We define the property of “I2eEnforceability” that dual
layer insertion functions has the ability to enforce opacity. By a given mission map of SIS and the marked secret missions, we propose an
algorithm to select fIS and compute its matchable fIA and then the DCUs which should be activated to release non-essential data flow in each step
is calculable.
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With the development of ship technology, the ship system
tends to be integrated and distributed which leads to a new
research area named ship information system (SIS). Although
different ships have different functions, all definitions found in
literature for a SIS have one key feature in common. As firstly
defined by us in Liu et al. (2014), a typical SIS is composed by* Fully documented templates are available in the elsarticle package on
CTAN.
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).several independent subnets (sensor networks, display net-
works, etc.) and a total ship communication network which
can exchange information (reference input, plant output,
control input, etc.) among subnets and systems. Similar to a
networked system, SIS research is categorized into the
following two parts which are Information processing and
Information transmission. The research on Information pro-
cessing is mainly focused on service ability such as control-
lability, observability (Xing et al., Zhi) and reachability (Xing
et al., 2015), etc. Meanwhile, the core attention on Information
transmission is service quality, such as anonymity (Wang and
Wang, 2014; Kumari and Khan, 2014) and secrecy (Rabbachin
et al., 2015; Liang et al, 2009), etc. The application of these
research results can ward off network intrusion and attacks,
prevent the content of data flow from leaking. However, for ahosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
Fig. 1. The insertion mechanism.
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confirmable, the on-going mission may also be revealed by
detecting the publishing actions of each DCU. In order to find
a solution of protecting some important mission states in SIS,
a new property of Information Flow named as opacity should
be considered in cybersecurity of SIS. Opacity was first
introduced in computer science literature (Mazare, 2004) and
later investigated in Discrete Event System (DES) framework
(Lin, 2011; Takai and Oka, 2008; Cassez et al., 2012; Wu and
Lafortune, 2013; Falcone and Marchand, 2015; Bryans et al.,
2008).
Without losing generality, the model of SIS mission state
can be also formulated as a DES and SIS is said to be opaque
if its “ secret” missions can be hidden from an undesirable
external observer which is referred as intruder. The intruder
is modeled to have full knowledge of the structure of SIS
(include the function and characteristic of the data flow from
each DCU), but can not obtain the content of each data flow.
And the SIS is said to be opaque if for any secret mission,
there must exist at least one other non-secret mission that
observationally equivalent from the intruder. Due to the
specificity of SIS, here we only consider about Current-
Mission State Opacity (CMSO) which is similar to
Current-State Opacity-SCO in Bryans et al. (2008). For
those systems which are not SCO, the mainly research point
is ensuring opacity, which is mainly approached as Super-
visory Control Theory (SCT) (Lin, 2011; Dubreil et al.,
2010; Ben-Kalefa and Lin, 2011) and enforcement
(Falcone and Marchand, 2015). As what has been contrasted
by Jacob et al. (2015), the difference between SCT and
enforcement is the way they preserve secret, SCT constrains
the happening of secret by the controller while enforcement
does not restrict system's behaviors but modifies its output to
hide the reveal of secret. As there may exist multi-
information in a single data flow, not only for secret
mission but also for normal mission, it is inadvisable to
protect secret mission by restricting the publish of data flow.
Thus we research on the enforcement of CMSO. There exist
three basic implement methods to enforce opacity by
modifying the output information to the observer, 1) deleting
events, 2) adding events and 3) delaying the output. Among
them, addition of events is a total non-intrusive approach and
can be used in such system which a secret is not time-
independent. This approach named as “insertion functions”
is first proposed by Wu and Lafortune in Wu and Lafortune
(2012).
As shown in Fig. 1, regarding as a monitoring interface at
system's output, the insertion function has the ability to modify
the actual output behavior with fictitious factors by inserting
additional observable events. The basic idea to design a suit-
able insertion function selection algorithm which can cheat the
intruder to omit the actual secrets meanwhile the intruder
could not learn the setting rule by analyzing the modified
output observation with system's structure.
In this paper, we follow and expand the basic design
rules of insertion functions which has been presented in Wu
and Lafortune (2014). Due to different objectives, fIS isdesigned to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret
behaviors from a unsafe one, and the division of fIA is to
polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We
define the property of “I2eEnforceability” for dual layer
insertion functions if they have the ability to enforce
opacity. By a given mission map of SIS and the marked
secret missions, we propose an algorithm to select fIS and
compute its matchable fIA and then the DCUs which should
be activated to release non-essential data flow in each step
is calculable.
To the best of our knowledge, security and opacity issues of
ship mission state in SIS have never been addressed so far.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the typical SIS mission model, and defines the
enforcement opacity problem which is introduced in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the proposed dual insertion function
structure which used in the enforcement of opacity. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. Structure of SISM2.1. Basic structure of SISAs shown in Fig. 2, the structure of SIS we proposed here
is similar to Raytheon Companys Total Ship Computing
Environment (TSCE) which is one of late-model for USS
Zumwalt (DDG-1000). The SIS network is a Double-loop
Broadcast Network which connect C2I (Command, Control
& Intelligence) system, 3 parallel-hosts monitoring system,
HumaneComputer Interface (HCI) and dozens of DCUs
which are located throughout the ship. And every sensor and
actuator which belongs to different systems in the ship are
added in this network through remote terminal units (RTUs)
with the most nearby DCU. That means a data flow Dm
released by DCUm may include kinds of information that are
needed in different systems. As a Broadcast Network in this
structure, for each component in SIS, to detect the releasing of
data flow is much easier than detecting receiving actions. And
according to different sequences of releasing action from each
DCU, the on-going mission of the ship is able to be
determined.2.2. SIS mission (SISM) modelsIf we consider each releasing action as an controllable
event, the mission states of SIS can be modeled as determin-
istic finite state automaton, G ¼ (X, E, Eint, Ehost, f, fc, X0),
which includes a set of mission states X, a set of release action
Fig. 2. Basic structure of SIS.
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ei) ¼ y means when DCUi release its data flow to SIS network
while mission x is running, the ship is proofed to run mission y
instead, Eint ¼ {eCCI, eHCI} denotes the data flow releasing of
CCI and HCI, respectively, similarly Ehost ¼ {Ehost1, Ehost2,
Ehost3} means each releasing action from host, and a set of
initial state X0. In addition, partial transition function is
defined as f: X0  Ehost / X0, where f(x, ehosti) ¼ y means
HOSTi joining the calculating process of initial mission state y
from x. And which should be mentioned, not all of mission
states in X have actual definitions, some of them may be
treated as staged mission states.
The running step of a normal SISM is shown in Fig. 3.
As a beginning flag of a SISM, the task is published by the
user from HCI or SIS core from CCI which means eCCI or eHCI
is one mark of setting a new mission starting at X0. Then the
host analyzes this mission and decomposes it into several
small submissions for each related DCU. It is a typical
Hierarchical-cooperative Structure (HCS). Once a DCU
receive its submission, it starts to control the plant through
mounted RTUs. Accordingly, RTUs will collect data from
correlated sensors and send them to DCU. In order to form
a closed loop, according to the command from each
submission, DCUn would only put necessary sensor data in
the data flow, and the releasing action is denoted as en. Andwe call mission state y as a cooperative mission by DCUm1
and DCUm2, if f(x, em1em2) ¼ f(x, em2em1) ¼ y is satisfied.
Meanwhile, DCUn1 is said to build a redundant structure
with DCUn2 for mission state y, if there is f(x, en1) ¼ f(x,
en2) ¼ y.
Let E* be denoted as the set of all finite strings over X plus the
empty string ε, then f can be extended to X  E* in the usual
manner. For a given stateS2X, the languagegenerated byG from
S is given by LðG; SÞ :¼ fs2E : dx2Ss:t:f ðx; sÞ!g where the
meaning of ! is “be defined”. For simplicity, when S ¼ X0, the
prefix-closed language L(G, X0) is denoted as L(G). Hence, the
event set are partitioned into the set of observable eventEo and the
set of unobservable event Euo, i.e., E ¼ Eo∪
_
Euo: The presence of
partial observation can be captured by the natural projection
P : E/Eo which is defined as
PðεÞ ¼ ε and PðssÞ ¼

PðsÞs
PðsÞ
ifs2Eo
ifs2Euo
ð1Þ
Which should be mentioned, the SIS mission (SISM)
model just bring a minimal necessary releasing action
strings for each mission. If the SIS is in a multi-task mode,
the mission state y can not happen from x when DCUm
releases its data flow without adding in all necessary in-
formation for y, even if there is f(x,em) ¼ y. Multi-task
mode is a typical working style, due to the high compu-
tation ability of DCUs. In most cases, a DCU can add all
necessary information it has for every on going missions in
one data flow. So we assume that if there is f(x,em) ¼ y,
once DCUm sends a data flow at mission state x, the
mission state is trusted to be y. Imperfect information
adding issue will be considered in the future. For now, the
way to determine each mission state in a multi-task pro-
cess is shown in Algorithm 1.
426 B. Xing et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 423e433The algorithm takes the observable release action q and a
multi-task string set which include every on-going mission
strings as input. Line 1e3, as q2EINT , which means a new
mission has been published by HCI or CCI. As shown in Line
4e9, q is a mark of further computing by HOST. According to
the analysis above, in Line 10e15, if this data flow is released
by a DCU, every mission which need this data would be to
next mission state.
Due to the calculations of Algorithm 1 and the hypothesis
of DCU's working mode in SIS, the releasing action q would
result in a new mission state for any task which needs the data
from DCUq. Therefore, even if SIS is in a multi-task mode,
every mission state is able to be determined which means a
potential unsafe action string is able to be screened out from a
multi-task string.
As for a middle scale SIS, there exist thousands of mission
states and hundreds of DCUs, here in Fig. 4, we only recite a
partial example of SISM. According to the definition of
G ¼ (X, E, Eint, Ehost, f, X0), there is X ¼ fx0; x1;/; x21g;
E ¼ {e1, e2, e3, e4}, Eint ¼ {eHCI}, Ehost ¼ {ehost1, ehost2} and
X0 ¼ {x0, x1, x2}. It can be seen that the general missions in G
is published by HCI, and decomposed by HOST1. HOST2 can2
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Fig. 4. A typicbe regarded as a parallel computer of HOST1 for x2. DCU4 is
only a redundant device of DCU1 during the running process
to x13, besides DCU2 and DCU3 work cooperatively from
mission sate x13 to x16.
Choosing x22 for example, the minimal necessary release
action string is denoted as eHCIeHOST1eHOST2e3e2ðe1=e4Þ
½e2e3e1e2e1e3e1e2, where (e1/e4) means redundant and [e2e3]
means cooperative relation. For a multi-task case, if the action
string is eHCIeHOST1e1eHCIeHOST1eHOST2e3e1e2, according to
Algorithm 1, there are two mission action strings, one is
eHCIeHOST1e1e3e1 at state x8, the other is eHCIeHOST1eHOST2e3e2
at state x12.
In order to state the proposed enforcing opacity structure
completely and comprehensively, without losing generality, in
the following of this paper, every example during the analysis
is based on Fig. 4.2.3. Secrets in SIS mission (SISM) modelsThe “secret mission” in a SIS is such a kind of infor-
mation (such as activation of fire control radar, fault report
of power system, etc.) which SIS wants to “hide” from an14e2 e3
e1
76 e1
e2
e2
e3
e2
16
e1
17
19
e1
18
e3
22 21e1 e3
e2
20
e2e3
15
al SISM.
Table 1
Definition of meaningful states in G.
State Definition
x3 Power failure in area 1
x7 Power supplied by sub-grid 2 for area 1
x8 Power supplied by sub-grid 3 for area 1
x10 Fire-fighting monitoring for area 3
x13 Activation of navigation system
x16 Activation of path planning mission
x19 Control of fin stabilizer
x22 Patrolling mission
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should not be restricted if they are on the list to be
happened.
Here we purpose a sub system of G ¼ (X, E, Eint, Ehost, f, fc,
X0) which is named as suffix subsystem Gsuf(xn) ¼ (Xsufn,
Esufn, fsufn, xn, Xsufn0) where xn is the initial state and
xn2X. L(Gsuf(xn)) is the set of all substrings of L(G) which
start from state xn. And there is Xsufn4X and Esufn4E,
which means for cxp4Xsufn, there always exists a
xp ¼ fsufnðxn; spÞ! where sp2Esufn.PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ ¼
8>>>>><
>>>>>:
ε if t1;r
t1
if t1 ¼ ri12r
butt2;ri1/rm
t1t2
if t1 ¼ ri12r; t2 ¼ ri22ri1/rm
butt3;ri2/rm
« «
t
if t1 ¼ ri12r;/; tn1 ¼ riðn1Þ2riðn1Þ/rm
and tn ¼ rin2riðn1Þ/rm
ð3ÞFor a SIS mission model G ¼ (X, E, Eint, Ehost, f, fc, X0), if
xsj is a secret mission state in a secret set Xs, every state in
Gsuf(xsj) is also belonged to Xs. And we define such secret xsj
an original secret, if there dxns2X=Xs and e2E, such that
xsj ¼ f(xns, e) is satisfied, and the set of original secrets in G is
denoted as Xos. Without any need of proof, G is safe if every
original secrets in G are hidden from the intruder.
Based on Fig. 4, the meaningful states of G are listed in
Table 1. And DCU1, DCU2 and DCU3 are located in the ship
motion control system.
The secret we want to hide is x3, which means every state in
Xsuf3 should be hidden from the intruder. If the x3 is protected
completely, every state in Xsuf3 is sensibly safe.
3. Preliminaries of enforcing opacity3.1. Screening - holding projectionAs defined in Wu and Lafortune (2012), the insertion
function has ability to insert any event in Eo which looks
identical to a system observable event. In order to distinguishbetween observable event and inserted event in this paper, we
denote inserted event by attaching insertion label (subscript i
or dashed feature), resulting in Ei ¼ fei : e2Eog. Projection
Pund is a natural projection that treats insertion transitions as
unobservable. There is PundðeiÞ ¼ ε, ei2Ei and Pund(e) ¼ e,
e2Eo Similarly, projection Poi is used in the exclusion of
event which is neither observable nor inserted, that means,
given e2E∪Ei; there is:
PoiðeÞ ¼

e if e2Eo∪Ei
ε if e2Euo∪fεg ð2Þ
Mi is a mask which is not able to distinguish between inserted
event and observable event. Given an event, there results
Mi(ei) ¼ e, ei2Ei and Mi(e) ¼ e, e2Eo.
Here we propose another projection named screening-
holding projection Psh to analyze admissible strings. Psh
is a nature projection that treat queue jumping transitions as
unobservable. Two strings r ¼ r1r2/rm and t ¼ t1t2/tn are
given. The definition of Psh((r)/(t)) is shown as follows:And for two strings r ¼ r1r2/rm and t ¼ t1t2/tn, if there
exists rm ¼ tn and Psh((r)/(t)) ¼ t, we reformulate it as
PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t.
For given strings r and t, the screening-holding projection
Psh((r)/(t)) can be counted by Algorithm 2 which operates as
follows.
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ðtaÞÞ^ta; there is Psh((rarb)/(tatb)) ¼ taPsh(rb/tb).
Proof. We assume that r ¼ rarb ¼ ra1ra2/ramrb1rb2/rbp; t ¼
tatb ¼ ta1 ra2/tanrb1rb2/rbp: And Pshðr=tÞ ¼ Pshððra1
ra2/ramrb1 rb2/rbpÞ=ðta1ra2/tanrb1rb2/rbpÞÞ: Based on
Equation (3), if there exists raðs1Þ ¼ tta1 and ras s ra2,
Psh(r/t) can be simplified as Psh(r/t) ¼ ta1Psh((ras
raðsþ1Þ/ramrb1rb2/rbpÞ /tanrb1rb2/rbpÞÞ, such ra(s1), as
Psh(ra/ta), such ra(s1) can be found in ta apparently. Further
more, as ram ¼ rbn, Psh(r/t) can be simplified step by step into
Pshðr=tÞ ¼ ra1ra2/ram Pshððrb1rb2/rbpÞ=ðrb1rb2/rbpÞÞ ¼
taPshðrb=tbÞ:
Theorem 2. For two strings r and t, if PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t, for
any prefix of t denoted as tq, there must exist a prefix of r
named as rp, which leads to PshððrpÞ=ðtmÞÞ^tm:Proof. Here
we assume that t ¼ tmtn (the last event in string tm is denoted as
tmj). As PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t, based on Equation (3), there is
Psh((r)/(tm)) ¼ tm. Furthermore, r can be divided into two
parts (denoted as r ¼ rprq, the ending event of rp is marked as
rpi) where tmj;rq and rpi ¼ tmj. Therefore, PshððrprqÞ=
ðtmÞÞ ¼ PshððrpÞ=ðtmÞÞ^tm:.
Theorem 3. For two strings r and t, if Psh((r)/(t)) ¼ t, there
must exist a prefix of r, denoted as rp, such that
PshððrpÞ=ðtÞÞ^t
Proof. Based on tq we expand a string tq which as a result
Pshðr=tqÞ^tq, here t is a prefix of tq. As what has been
proofed in Theorem 2, for the two prefixes t and rp, there must
be PshððrpÞ=ðtÞÞ^t.3.2. Insertion functionsAn insertion function in this paper has the ability to take
an observed event from the system, possibly inserts extra
observable events, and then outputs the resulting string. In
terms of the intruder, the extra inserted events are indistin-
guishable from genuine observable events. That is, the
intruder does not recognize the virtual insertion label.
Therefore, the intruder, observing at the output of the
insertion function, cannot tell if the observed string includes
inserted events or not. Given a modified string s2ðEo∪EiÞ
from the insertion function, the intruder observes s under
mask Mi. We can also reconstruct the genuine string by
applying projection Pund to s. Which should be mentioned
that the intruder is assumed to have no knowledge of the
insertion function at the outset but it can detect the existence
of insertion function by sensing unreasonable output
behaviors.
The basic structure of insertion function we used in this
paper is defined as fI : E

o  Eo/EoEo which outputs a string
with insertion parts based on the knowledge of system's his-
torical and current observed behavior. Given a string t where
P(t) ¼ s that has been executed in the system and the currentobserved event eo2Eo, the insertion function is defined as fI(s,
eo) ¼ sIeo which means we select string sI2ei to insert before
eo. And a pair (s, eo) is used to denote the systems historical
and current observed behavior which determined the output of
fI. Here we assume that no sI is of unbounded length. The
function fI defines the instantaneous insertion for every (s, eo).
To determine the completely modified string from the inser-
tion function, we define an equivalent string-based insertion
function f strI from fI : f
str
I ðεÞ ¼ ε and f strI ðsnÞ ¼ fIðε; e1Þ
fIðe1; e2Þ/fIðe1e2en1; enÞ where sn ¼ e1e2/en2Eo. Given a
G as the modified language output from the insertion function
which is f strI ðP½LðGÞÞ ¼ f~s2ðEi EoÞ : ~s ¼ f strI ðsnÞ∧s2P½L
ðGÞg and is denoted hereafter by Lout.
According to the definition of Psh((r)/(t)) and insertion
functions, such substrings of r which cannot follow the event
queue of t would be eliminated by Psh((r)/(t)). Hence we
have the following result:
Lemma 1. For two strings r and t there must exist such
insertion functions mechanism which as result is f strI ðtÞ ¼ r if
PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t.
Proof. As PshððrÞ=ðtÞÞ ¼ t which means r can be rewritten as
r ¼ r1/ri1/rin/rm ¼ r1/t1/tn/rm. And the insertion
function can be designed as follows: f strI ðtÞ ¼ fIðε; t1Þ fI
ðt1; t2Þ/fIðt1t2tn1; tnÞ ¼ r1/ri11; t1; ri1þ1/ri21; t2/; ri
ðn 1Þ þ 1/rin1; tn ¼ r1/rin2rm. The computing method
of insertion function set FI(r, t) when Psh(r/t) ¼ t is shown in
algorithm 3. According to Line 3 and 4, the computational
complexity of algorithm 3 is O(nm).3.3. Problem definitionNormally, designers preset (predefine) part of system's
representation as secrets by its importance or possibility of
intruder's attention. Due to the particularity of SISM, in this
paper, we only consider about CSO, which is:
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G ¼ (X,E,f, X0) is current-state opaque w.r.t. XS4X and
Eo4E if ci2X0 such that f ði; tÞ4XS; dj2X0; dt02Lðj; t0Þ
such that: (i) f ðj; t0Þ4XyXS and (ii) PðtÞ ¼ Pðt0Þ:Based on
definition 1, it is known that opacity will hold if the intruder’s
observation is always belonged to safe strings denoted as ls,
and there is ls4LsðGÞ where Ls(G) is a sublanguage of L(G)
called safe language.As the basic rule of design insertion
functions which is to add extra observable events which
disguises every unsafe string lusi4LðGÞ=LsðGÞ in L(G) as a
safe and existing string lsi4LsðGÞ from the intruder’s
observation. And if such insertion functions exist, the system
is said to be enforced opacity.
According to Definition 1, Algorithm 1 and 2, here we
have:
Definition 2. (Enforcing opacity) A unsafe system
G ¼ (X,E,f,X0) with secret set Xs is able to be enforced
opacity, if clusi2LðGÞ=LSðGÞ, there exists lsi2LSðGÞ, such
that PshððlsiÞ=ðlusiÞÞ^lusi is satisfied and the insertion func-
tions which modified the output behavior as f strI ðlusiÞ ¼ lsi are
stored in FI(lsi,lusi).So the core problem of enforcing opacity in
this paper is for a given lusi, how to determine the corre-
sponding lsi which leads PshððlsiÞ=ðlusiÞÞ^lusi. And based on
Theorem 1, we can consider this problem gradationally. Based
on Definition 1, it is shown that the system G with
Eo ¼ {e1,e2,e3} and Xs ¼ Xsuf3 in Fig. 4 is not CSO. And the
main work in this paper is how to enforce opacity for such SIS
just like G.4. Dual insertion function structure
In this paper, we propose a new opacity enforcement
structure based on dual insertion functions named as Safety-
assured insertion function and Admissibility assured inser-
tion function respectively to protect the secrets in SIS.
For such a non-safety SIS, according to this dual
insertion function structure, some unnecessary DCUs are
activated and release their data flow in SIS during the
unsafe strings to change the output behaviors from the
intruder. As we mainly consider such data flow from
DCUs, here we simplify G as G ¼ (X,E,f,X0,Xms), where
Xms is the marked states set (which is also the secret set)
of G.4.1. Definition of fIS,fIA and I2eEnforceabilityDefinition 3. (Safety-assured insertion function set,
FIS(lcni,sn)) Given system G ¼ (X,E,f,X0,Xms), if that for
sn2LmðGÞ, dlcni2LðGÞ=LmðGÞ, such that FIS(lcni,sn), such
that dMi ðf strIS ðsnÞÞ ¼ lcni. Here FIS(lcni,sn) is named as
Safety-assured insertion function set of sn.And the collect of
all the possible strings lcni which satisfies Definition 3 isnamed as Candidate language of sn, and denoted as Lcsn(G).
If Lcsn(G) ¼ f, sn is impossible to be modified to any safe
string by adding events from the output.Which should be
mentioned that L(Gsuf(Xms)) can be treated as the suffix set of
all strings which would reveal the secret state belonging to
Xms. XsufXms 4X is the subsequent states set after the
happening of secret states.
Definition 4. (Admissibility-assured insertion function set,
FIA ðlcnik; lsnjÞ). Given a system G ¼ (X,E,f,X0,Xms) which is
able to be repaired to admissibility by FIAðlcnik; lsnjÞ after the
modification done by FIS(lcni,sn), if for clsnj2LðGsuf
ðf ðx0; snÞÞÞ, there exists lcnik2LðGsuf ( f(x0,lcni))), such that
Miðf strIA ðlsnjÞÞ ¼ lcnik. Here FIA(lcnik, lsnjÞ is named as an
Admissibility-assured insertion function set paired with
FIS(lcni,sn).Based on the definition of Psh((r)/(t)), the two-
tiered insertion mechanism which can enforce opacity we
proposed in this paper named as enforceability that could be
defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Enforceability, I2eEnforceability) Given sys-
tem G ¼ (X,E,f, X0,Xms), such dual insertion function structure
is called I2eEnforcing if csn2LmðGÞ and clsnj2
LðGsuf ðf ðx0; snÞÞÞ, there exists lcni2LðGÞ=LsðGÞ, such that
Psh((lcni)/(sn)) ¼ sn (Safety) and dlcnik2LðGsuf ðf ðx0; lcniÞÞÞ
such that Psh((lcnik)/(lsnj)) ¼ lsnj (Admissibility).4.2. Computing method of safety-assured insertion
function setAs what has proofed in Lemma 1 and Algorithm 2, for a
given string s, we can always modified it to li by adding extra
events iff there is PshððliÞ=ðsÞÞ^s and these extra events can
be always determined by FI(li,s). Here if s is unsafe but li is
safe, FI(li,s) would be a suitable safety-assured insertion
function set. Which means for a unsafe string s, we can
determine FIS(li,s) by finding a safe li which satisfies
PshððliÞ=ðsÞÞ^s. In most case, there may exist several safe
strings meet the assumption above and in this paper we put
them in candidate language Lc(G). The computing process of
Lc(G) is shown in Algorithm 4.
The algorithm takes the initiation unsafe string s and lan-
guage Ls(G) as input. Line 1 differentiating each string in
Ls(G) by adding a subscript, and preset the candidate language
Lc(G) which includes every strings of Ls(G). Lines 2e8, show
the way to identify the safe strings which can be modified by
adding extra events from s based on Lemma 1, and each
strings are remarked in Line 9. Lines 10e17, make a further
screening of Lc(G) which only reserve the most simplified and
satisfactory prefixes of each strings in Lc(G). If Lci(G) ¼ f is
satisfied, G is impossible to be enforced opacity by adding
extra events (Not I2eEnforcing). The output of this algorithm
is the candidate language Lc(G). And by choosing the string lci
from Lc(G) such FIS(lci,s) must exist which can prevent the
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initiation unsafe string is s ¼ e1. Based on Line 2e8 in Al-
gorithm 4, Lc(G) in Line 9 is {e2e1, e3e2e1; e3e2ðe1=e4Þ
½e3e2e1, e3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1e2e1, e3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1e2e1e3e1,
e3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1e2e3e2e1g. And then a further screening of
Lc(G) runs, fe3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1, e3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1e2e1, e3e2
ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e*1e2e1e3e1, e3e2ðe1=e4Þ½e3e2e1e2e3e2e1g should
be deleted from Lc(G) because of the existence of string
e3e2e1. The result of candidate language in Line 21 is
Lc(G) ¼ {e2e1,e3e2e1}. And all the possible safety-assured
insertion function set FIS of G which can protect secret xs
are FIS(e2e1,e1) ¼ {fIS(ε,e1) ¼ e2ie1} and FIS(e3e2e1,e1) ¼
{fIS(ε,e1) ¼ e3ie2ie1}. The next step runs re-examination of
these FIS. Due to the nested loop in Line 10 to 15, the
computational complexity of algorithm 4 is O(n2).10e1
e3
Fig. 5. Suffix subsystem Gsuf(x10).4.3. Computing method of admissibility-assured
insertion function set
4.3.1. Admissibility-assured insertion function set
After screening every possible strings in L(G) which can be
used in the construction of safety-assured insertion function
set, and in this subsection we will determine whether a string
lci in Lc(G) is suitable to enforce opacity which is denoted as
I2eEnforcing through lci. We select each candidate string in
Lc(G) by turn, and search Admissibility-assured insertion
function set, FIA, which can polish every modified output
behaviors back to normal strings, meanwhile, collect these two
kind of strings in pair in a set CL(G).Algorithm 5 shows the searching algorithmic of CL(G).
The algorithm takes as input the initiation unsafe string s and
candidate language Lc(G) which is marked in Line 1. Line 2
initialize suffix subsystem Gsuf(xs), as xs is the secret state of
G, that means L(Gsuf(xs)) includes all the strings which can
lead s$lsj to a unsafe string. Or said differently, every strings in
L(G)/Ls(G) can be denoted as s$lsj where lsj2Gsuf ðxsÞ. The
Non-prefix lsj2LpreðGsuf ðxsÞÞ means lsj is not a prefix of any
other strings in L(Gsuf(xs)). It could consider that language
L(G) is build up by several Non-prefix strings and their pre-
fixes, so does the each suffix subsystem of L(G). Based on FSA,
when s happens, the intruder is deceived to observe such
output lci which belongs to Lc(G). That is the reason why
system could be safe. To enforce admissibility, such insertion
function sets should exist that modifies each string lci$lsj looks
normal by the intruder. For a string xci in Lc(G), Line 4e5
define its suffix subsystem Gsuf(xci). The intruder can only
accept such output behaviors after the happening of s if it has
been defined in Gsuf(xci). As L(Gsuf(xs)) is fixed, Line 6e27
works like a deeper screening to sort out an acceptable lci by
estimating constructibility from L(Gsuf(xs)) to L(Gsuf(xci)).
14e1,e4 e2 e3
e1
e2
e3
e2
16
e1
17
19
e1
18
e3
22 21e1 e3
e2
20
e2e3
13
15
Fig. 6. Suffix subsystem Gsuf(x13).
Table 2
Result of I2eEnforcing through ca.
Unsafe string of G State Modified strings Modified state
e1 x3 eHOST2e3ie2ie1 x13
e1e3 x4 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3 x15
e1e3e1 x8 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2ie2ie3ie1 x19
e1e3e1e3 x8 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2ie2ie3ie1e3 x19
e1e3e2 x5 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2 x16
e1e3e2e3 x6 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2e2ie1ie3 x21
e1e3e2e3e1 x7 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2e2ie1ie3e1 x22
e1e3e2e3e1e2 x7 eHOST2e3ie2ie1e3e2e2ie1ie3e1e2 x22
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exists lci2LcðGÞ and for every non-prefix lsj2LðGsuf ðxsÞÞ in
Line 11, there exists lcik2LðGsuf ðxciÞÞ, such that Psh((lcik)/
(lsj)) ¼ lsj, the admissibility-assured insertion function set
FIA(lcik,lsj) exists. And the correspondences between each lcik
and lsj are saved in CL(G). In order to decrease the quantity of
calculation Line 7e8, a prejudging method of remove un-
suitable candidate strings from Lc(G) is provided. The
computational complexity of Algorithm 5 is O( pw), where w
is the size of Lnpre(Gsuf(xs)).
According to Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5, for a system G,
when a unsafe string slsj is happening, the modified output be-
haviors received by the intruder are lcilcik2LðGÞ which is deter-
mined by FIS(s,ci) and FIA(lsj,lcik), the system is I2eEnforcing.
And such modification is denoted as fisia(slsj) ¼ lcilcik and stored
in an insertion function set FISIA(G  lci).
a. Searching result of CL(G) when choosing lc1
Fig. 5 shows the Suffix subsystem Gsuf(x10). It can been
seen that Esufe2e1 ¼ {e3} and Esufe1⊄Esufe2e1 . Some strings
in Gsuf(x3) included specific alphabets that Gsuf(x10) does not
have. That means it is impossible to modify every strings in
Gsuf(x3) to a string which exists in Gsuf(x10) by adding extra
events. For this reason, G is not I2eEnforcing through e2e1.
b. Searching result of CL(G) when choosing lc2
Then the Algorithm 5 starts to calculate whether lc2 is
suitable or not.
Fig. 6 shows the Suffix subsystem Gsuf(x13). It can been
seen that Esufe3e2e1 ¼ {e1,e2,e3} which is equal to Esufe1, that
means lc2 passes the prejudging method in Line 7e8. And then
the non-prefix string set of L(Gsuf(xs)) is worked out as
fe3e1e3; e3e2e3e1e2g, the core computing starts. After counting
every strings in L(Gsuf(x13)), the result shows that G is
I2eEnforcing through e3e2e1 and CLðGÞ ¼ ½e3e1e3 ½e3e2Fig. 7. Structure of duale2e3e1e

3, e3e1e

3  ½e3e2e1e2e3e1e3, e3e1e3  ½e3e2e2e3e2e1e3,
e3e1e

3  ½e3e2e1e2e3e2e1e3, e3e1e3  ½e3e2e2e3e2e1e3, e3e2e3
e1e

2  ½e3e2e1e2e1e3e1e2, e3e2e3e1e2  ½e3e2e2e1e3e1e2.4.4. Structure of dual insertion function setThe structure of dual insertion functions we proposed in
this paper is shown in Fig. 7.
Here we use two kinds of insertion function set FIS and FIA
to enforce opacity. For the secret state xs, the first step is to
determine the initiation unsafe string s where xs ¼ f(x0,s), and
s is the prefix of all the unsafe strings in L(G)/Ls(G) which can
reveal the secret xs. And then, for the second step, we acquire
and collect all the possible strings which can be modified by
insertion function from s in a subset of L(G) named candidate
language Lc(G). And these kind of insertion function which is
designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret
behaviors from a unsafe one is named as Safety-assured
insertion function, fIS. If Lc(G) is a null set, G is impossible
to be enforced opacity by adding extra events (Not
I2eEnforcing). If Lc(G) is not null, in step 3, we select each
candidate string in Lc(G) by turn, and search such insertion
functions named as Admissibility-assured insertion functions,
fIA which can polish every modified output behaviors back to
normal strings, meanwhile, collecting these two kind of strings
in pair in a set CL(G) and at this situation G is I2eEnforcing,
otherwise it is not.4.5. OptimizingActually, based on the computation mode above, for non-
safe system G there may exist several options to enforce
opacity. As in this paper, every addition event is physically
done by realising data flow in SIS network which would cause
a waste of network resources. Therefore, optimization is
extremely important to consider. Here we proposed 3 princi-
ples to comparing each solution.insertion functions.
432 B. Xing et al. / International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering 8 (2016) 423e433a. Selection of candidate string lci
Rule (a). For two candidate string lca and lcb which both
have the ability to build I2eEnforcing insertion function
structure, if nca>ncb, choosing FISIA(G  lcb), and vice versa,
where nca and ncb are the sum of inserted events for each
unsafe string in G based on lca and lcb, respectively.
According to Algorithmic 4 and 5, lca and lcb are two basic
solution can be used in the computing of corresponding
admissibility-assured insertion function set. Rule (a) brings a
selection method which can economize valuable network re-
sources with its best from the point of reducing unexpected
releasing actions.
b. Simplification of Lc(G)
Rule (b). For lsj  lcip and lsj  lciq in CL(G), iflcip> lciq, delete lsj  lcip from CL(G) and vice versa.
According to Algorithmic 5, there is Psh(lcip/
lsj) ¼ Psh(lciq/lsj) ¼ lsj, which means secret string lsj can be
hidden and modified into lcip and lciq by different insertion
functions. Therefore lcip and lciq are functionally equivalent.
As for a lsj, only one corresponding pair is necessary in CL(G),
the string with longer length should be deleted to reduce the
times of releasing actions.
Due to rule (b) above, the CL(G) is simplified as
CLðGÞ ¼ ½e3e1e3  ½e3e2e2e3e1e3,
e3e2e3e1e

2  ½e3e2e2e1e3e1e2. As there is only one qualified
candidate string remained, this CL(G) is the only solution to
enforce opacity for the SISM in Fig. 4.
Ground on Algorithm 2, 3 and Theorem1, 2, 3, there is the
safety-assured insertion function set FIS ¼ [fis(ε,e1)] ¼
[(e3ie2ie1)] and the admissibility-assured insertion function
set FIA ¼ [fia(ε, e3), fia(e3,e1), fia(e3e1,e3), fia(e3 e1e3; e3Þ,
fia(e3, e2), fia(e3e2, e3), fia(e3e2e3,e1), fia(e3e2e3e1,e2),
fia(e3e2e3e1e

2; e2Þ ¼ ½ðe3Þ; (e3e2ie2ie3ie1), (e3e2ie2ie3ie1e3),
ðe3e2ie2ie3ie1e3Þ, (e3e2), (e3e2e2ie1ie3), (e3e2e2ie1ie3e1),
(e3e2e2ie1ie3e1e2), ðe3e2e2ie1ie3e1e2Þ. And the insertion func-
tion for each unsafe string in G is confirmable listed in Table 2.
The result shows that the power failure state (x3) and
reconfiguration mission (x4  x8) is hidden by normal ship
motion control mission safety and admissibility. This SISM is
“I2eEnforceability”.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a dual layer mechanism based on
two types of insertion function named Safety-assured insertion
function ( fIS) and Admissibility-assured insertion function
( fIA) to enforce opacity for ship information system where fIS
is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret
behaviors from a unsafe one, and the division of fIA is to
polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We
define the property of “I2eEnforceability” that dual layer
insertion functions has the ability to enforce opacity. Given a
SIS mission model, we propose an algorithm to select fIS and
compute its matchable fIA. As it is a large and heavycomputing work to test the safety and admissibility of each
possible insertion function, dislike the opacity enforceability
research before, the paramount consideration in this paper is
for a non-safe output behavior slsj which could be modified as
safe string lcilcik. Then based on the unsafe string slsj and its
acceptable modification lcilcik, the necessary extra activated
DCUs during each secret mission process are able to be
determined by the result of FISIA(G  lci). Meanwhile,
several principles are proposed in the compare of all possible
solution to find the easiest method to enforce opacity. The
computing process is easy to implement and high-efficiency.
Based on the structure of dual insertion function proposed
in this paper, we are interested in the following research
points.5.1. Enforcing opacity for a system with unfixed secretIn previous research, the secret is always given and fixed.
However, for some intruders, their interest points may be
changed based on the system's previous process (internal
incentive). For example, the activation of fire lader is a secret
only if some weapons has already activated. Meanwhile, SIS
would revise its guard point under certain external circum-
stances (external incentive, such as cyber-attack, etc.). In view
of the above-mentioned incentives, these systems should have
the adaptability to protect their unfixed secrets.5.2. Imperfect information releasing issue in multi-task
modeIn this paper, we assume that a DCU will send all required
information in a single data flow. However, if the length of
each data flow is fixed and limited, it is impossible to add
all necessary information at once. Imperfect information
releasing issue should be considered.
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